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As	liberal	Britain	leaves,	will	the	EU	become	more
protectionist?
The	Conservative	majority	following	the	December	2019	UK	General	Election	means	that	negotiations	between	the
UK	and	EU	will	from	February	move	from	the	‘divorce’	talks	to	discussing	the	future	economic	partnership.	The
content	of	this	new	economic	partnership	will	be	of	vital	importance	not	just	for	EU-UK	relations,	but	also	for	the
UK’s	and	the	EU’s	own	future	policies.
In	a	special	issue	of	the	journal	Politics	and	Governance,	a	group	of	scholars	has	assessed	how	Brexit	–	including
different	possible	outcomes	for	the	future	economic	partnership	–	might	affect	EU	policies	across	a	range	of
policies.	In	this	blog	post,	we	build	on	our	own	contribution	concerning	EU	trade	policy	in	the	light	of	the	new	UK
government	and	European	Commission,	which	also	assumed	office	in	December	of	last	year.
The	common-sense	position	amongst	many	observers	has	been	that	that	Brexit	is	likely	to	make	EU	trade	policy
more	protectionist,	as	one	of	the	most	commercially	liberal	member	states	will	leave	the	EU.	We	contend	that	this
prediction	needs	to	be	qualified	for	at	least	three	reasons.
While	Brexit	will	lead	to	the	removal	of	UK	representatives	from	the	EU	institutions,	it	does	not	necessarily	mean
that	the	interests	currently	represented	by	the	UK	will	disappear.	Economic	operators	might	decide	to	relocate	their
activities	to	the	EU.	The	extent	to	which	this	will	happen	depends	not	just	on	the	future	economic	partnership,	but
also	on	the	degree	of	ongoing	uncertainty.
A	failure	to	agree	on	a	future	economic	partnership	without	an	extension	to	the	transition	period	is	likely	to	be	a
highly	unstable	outcome	politically	given	its	significant	(negative)	impacts.	Where	a	cliff	edge	is	avoided	despite	the
UK	government	sticking	to	its	insistence	that	it	will	not	seek	an	extension	to	the	transition	period,	the	Commission’s
position	is	that	negotiators	‘will	have	to	prioritise’.	Issues,	where	the	EU	cannot	take	unilateral	mitigating	action,
would	likely	be	resolved	later.	And	if	the	transition	period	is	extended	that	would	also	prolong	the	uncertainty.
The	important	point	is	that	one	cannot	simply	‘subtract’	current	UK	interests	from	the	EU’s	future	preference
constellation	as	much	depends	on	how	businesses	react.	Both	a	looser	economic	partnership	and	more	uncertainty
might	mean	that	more	UK-based	interests	dependent	on	frictionless	trade	and	cross-border	service	delivery	might
relocate	to	the	Union.	Counterintuitively,	a	hard	Brexit,	following	a	drawn-out	negotiation,	might	actually	lead	to
fewer	changes	in	the	EU’s	interest	constellation	than	closer	economic	alignment	following	a	smoother	set	of	talks.
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Secondly,	other	public	or	private	actors	in	the	EU	that	align	with	the	UK	on	trade	policy	might	adjust	their	strategies
to	secure	their	interests	post-Brexit.	This	has	already	happened	with	the	creation	of	the	Hanseatic	League,	a
coalition	of	small,	northern	European	Member	States	supportive	of	free	trade	and	budgetary	restraint.
Finally,	the	future	course	of	EU	trade	policy	also	depends	on	how	Brexit	is	framed.	If	the	referendum	result	is
interpreted	as	a	call	for	protection	by	the	losers	of	globalisation,	a	less	liberal	response	is	likely.	But	if	Brexit	is
framed	as	a	retrograde,	protectionist	move,	then	it	could	serve	to	legitimate	(more)	open,	and	potentially
deregulatory,	trade	policies.
In	the	three	and	a	half	years	since	the	referendum,	the	EU	has	generally	reinforced	its	liberal	trade	policy
orientation.	Brexit	and	the	election	of	Donald	Trump	as	US	President	were	seized	on	by	the	European	Commission
to	present	the	Union	as	the	‘leader	in	trade’	that	the	world	needs.	In	this	period,	under	the	leadership	of
Commission	President	Jean-Claude	Juncker	and	Trade	Commissioner	Cecilia	Malmström,	a	plethora	of	ongoing
trade	negotiations	have	been	concluded	with	the	likes	of	Canada,	Japan	and	Mercosur	(the	regional	economic	bloc
involving	Brazil,	Argentina,	Uruguay	and	Paraguay).	New	talks	were	also	launched	with	Australia	and	New	Zealand,
amongst	others.	However,	as	the	Brexit	process	moves	to	its	next	stage,	and	with	a	new	European	Commission	in
office	under	the	leadership	of	Ursula	von	der	Leyen,	there	exists	an	opportunity	to	reframe	the	EU’s	trade	policies.
The	day	after	the	UK	General	Election,	von	der	Leyen	stated	that	the	EU’s	goal	in	the	upcoming	negotiations	was	to
achieve	‘zero	tariffs,	zero	quotas,	zero	dumping’.	This	new	slogan	underlines	the	importance	accorded	by	the	EU	to
preserve	a	‘level	playing	field’	between	the	EU	and	the	UK.	The	aim	is	to	avoid	UK-based	firms	undercutting	EU
firms	as	a	result	of	less	stringent	competition	and	state	aid	rules,	lower	taxes	and	laxer	social	and	environmental
protection.
Such	provisions	–	providing	for,	amongst	other	things,	non-regression	on	labour	standards	and	environmental	rules,
dynamic	alignment	on	state	aid	rules	and	the	transposition	of	EU	tax	directives	–	were	already	included	in	the	initial
draft	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	which	featured	a	‘backstop’	customs	union	between	the	EU	and	the	UK.	They
may	have	since	been	dropped	in	the	renegotiated	Withdrawal	Agreement	–	which	no	longer	features	such	an
agreement	on	a	customs	union	–	but	remain	relevant	for	the	next	phase.	Top	EU	politicians	and	officials	have	since
repeatedly	warned	the	UK	that	it	should	not	follow	up	on	the	threat,	or	ambition,	to	turn	itself	into	a	‘Singapore-on-
Thames’	if	it	wants	to	maintain	easy	access	to	the	Single	Market.
Beyond	Brexit	and	the	UK,	this	strengthened	emphasis	on	a	level	playing	field	in	exchange	for	extensive	market
access	could	become	a	more	extensive	feature	of	the	EU’s	future	trade	policy	with	third	parties.	While	the	UK	is
both	more	proximate	and	significant	than	other	trade	partners,	there	is	an	argument	to	be	made	that	the	EU	could
be	more	consistent:	it	is	harder	for	the	EU	to	justify	withholding	market	access	to	the	UK	if	it	pursues	a	‘Singapore-
on-Thames’	strategy	when	it	just	concluded	a	trade	agreement	with	Singapore	that	did	not	feature	as	stringent
provisions.
We	would	argue	that	the	context	is	potentially	also	fortuitous	in	terms	of	upgrading	the	EU’s	relatively	weaker
commitments	on	ensuring	a	‘level	playing	field’	on	social	and	environmental	standards.	Recent	provisions	in	free
trade	agreements	have	only	gone	as	far	on	non-regression	(e.g.	in	CETA)	and	are	not	enforceable	through
sanctions.
Reciprocity	has	been	a	long-standing	motif	within	EU	trade	policymaking,	informing	previous	moves	to	establish	an
International	Procurement	Instrument	and	the	EU’s	2010	‘Trade,	Growth	and	World	Affairs’	strategy.	But	current
policies	are	pulling	reciprocity	in	a	stronger	and	markedly	more	environmental	direction.	The	new	Commission’s
ambitions	in	respect	of	climate	and	environmental	policy,	as	outlined	in	the	‘European	Green	Deal’,	have	led	it	to
propose	a	‘carbon	border	mechanism’	that	seeks	to	prevent	‘carbon	leakage’	–	or	the	offshoring	of	emissions.
While	many	EU	policymakers	may	hope	that	‘Brexit’	will	become	a	less	prominent	feature	of	2020,	its	effects	on	the
EU	still	loom	large.	As	the	process	moves	to	the	next	stage	of	negotiations	on	the	future	economic	partnership,	the
impact	of	Brexit	on	EU-UK	relations	and	on	the	UK’s	and	EU’s	future	policies	remains	uncertain.	In	EU	trade	policy,
we	have	so	far	not	seen	a	protectionist	turn	as	has	been	expected	by	several	observers.	However,	if	the
negotiations	with	the	UK	raise	the	profile	of	‘level	playing	field’	provisions	on	the	environment	and	labour	standards
this	could	change	EU	trade	policy	in	the	longer	term.	For	the	better,	we	would	say.
♣♣♣
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Notes:
This	blog	post	appeared	first	on	LSE	Brexit.
The	post	expresses	the	views	of	its	author(s),	not	the	position	of	LSE	Business	Review	or	the	London	School
of	Economics.
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